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Abstract There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, state-
ments or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical
formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of
valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it
calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their
relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong
arguments against the proposals commonly put forward in the debate. The core of
the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for pre-
supposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may
adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories
are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of
the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utter-
ances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of
propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information
about linguistic structure and pragmatic context.
Keywords Logic  Philosophy of logic  Formalization  Proposition 
Natural language
In the philosophical tradition of logic, the question ‘‘What are the objects of logic?’’
seems to admit of at least one undisputed answer. As Peirce (1902, pp. 20–21) noted
more than a 100 years ago: ‘‘Nearly a hundred definitions of [logic] have been
given. It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the
classification of arguments, so that all of those that are bad are thrown into one
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division, and those which are good into another.’’ But as soon as we want a more
specific answer than ‘‘arguments’’, disagreement starts. To be sure, arguments
consist of premises and conclusions, but as what kind of objects should we think of
these? Some combinations of premises and conclusion constitute valid inferences,
but what is it that stands in this relation of valid inference? At this point we face a
well-known debate between proponents of either propositions, sentences, statements
or utterances. It has led to a situation in which one can seemingly embrace any of
these standard answers and be sure that one’s opponents face as many objections as
one does. This, of course, raises doubts whether the different positions really deal
with the same problem. It is also a motivation for re-evaluating some of the
arguments in light of a more clearly framed question. Some 10 years ago, Grandy
(1993) suggested that we interpret the question ‘‘What are the objects of logic?’’ as
equivalent to ‘‘What do ‘Q’ and ‘R’ stand for?’’ (using ‘‘Q’’ and ‘‘R’’ as examples of
the so-called ‘‘propositional variables’’). He then argued that there are convincing
arguments against the popular proposals for answering that latter question. The core
of his criticism is that not enough attention is paid to the relation between logic and
ordinary language. This paper further explores this line of thought, based on an
explication of Grandy’s question.
For the philosophy of logic, the debate about propositions, sentences and so on is
a key issue since it concerns the question of how we may understand the common
practice of using logical formalisms in philosophy. The assumption that proofs of
validity and logical analysis of various expressions can tell us anything about
arguments and statements in ordinary language calls for a theory about the relation
of logical formulas to premises and conclusions. In a wider context, the question of
what objects logical formulas stand for is of interest because it relates to different
yet closely connected issues not dealt with in this paper, such as questions about the
objects of propositional attitudes and about the bearers of truth and modality.
In Sect. 1, I will first explain how taking seriously the tradition characterized by
Peirce motivates Grandy’s interpretation of the question about the objects of logic.
Subsequently, a more precise formulation of the leading question will be developed.
Section 2 will deal with the pros and cons of the most common answers, as well as
with conditions any defensible proposal must meet. This discussion will also
confront us with a deficit in the logical tradition: the established practice of proving
arguments to be valid is not based on a theoretically respectable account of the
relation between formulas and the ordinary language expressions they substitute for.
Since an extensive treatment of formalization lies outside the scope of this paper,
Sect. 3 will discuss only some consequences for theories of formalization which can
be drawn from the arguments in Sect. 2.
1 Explicating the Question
This section proposes a more exact replacement for the rather vague question about
the objects of logic. Firstly, I will outline how a traditional understanding of logic
gives us some motivation for focusing on the more specific problem of ‘‘What do
logical formulas stand for?’’ I then propose an analysis of this question that relies on
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distinguishing and explicating two uses of the metaphorical ‘‘standing for’’ while
still leaving room for the well-known answers ‘‘propositions’’, ‘‘sentences’’ and so
on.
In philosophy, logic has traditionally been understood as a theory of valid
arguments, hence historic labels such as ars iudicandi or canon of valid reasoning.
Importantly, this is taken to cover arguments which are presented in an ordinary
language, be that a natural language, such as Greek or English, or a more specialized
and regimented idiom of science. Such an understanding does not necessarily imply
that logic exclusively deals with valid arguments, but only that this is the ‘‘core
business’’ of logic. Theories or formalisms which do not tell us anything about the
validity of arguments are not logical theories or logical formalisms. Of course, in
philosophy the analysis not of arguments but of particular sentences—or rather
certain classes of sentences (or statements, propositions and so on)—plays an
important role. But even when logical analysis is done without aiming at proving the
validity of any particular argument, qua logical analysis this business can always be
understood as an analysis of a sentence with respect to its possible occurrence in
(in)valid arguments (Frege 1879, p. 3). On the other hand, the development of
mathematical and formalist approaches to logic has established another use of the
word ‘‘logic’’ that refers to a purely formal science or a branch of mathematics
studying not arguments but certain formal or mathematical objects. From this
perspective, investigating the validity of arguments is a task not of ‘‘pure’’ but of
‘‘applied’’ logic. In this paper, I will not rely on such a distinction, but assume the
traditional understanding of logic as the study of valid arguments.
This point of view can be elaborated by looking more closely at the established
procedure for proving the validity of an argument. Such proofs can be reconstructed
as involving the following steps (cf. Rosenberg 1986, pp. 69–71):
0. If needed, the argument is brought into a standard form, which is a sequence1 of
premises and a conclusion. Let us call such a sequence an inference. Identifying
premises and conclusion can involve a great deal of interpretation and mostly
relies not on logic but on techniques of text-analysis. Logical analysis proper
starts with inferences and consists of the next three steps. (I will briefly
comment on argument-analysis in Sect. 3.2.)
1. The premises and the conclusion are formalized in some logical system;2 that is,
they each are assigned a (well-formed) formula. Of course, formalizing cannot
be reduced to coming up with just any formula, but requires a formula that
actually represents a logical form of the premise or conclusion which it is
intended to be a formalization of. It often goes unnoticed that this presupposes
that there are criteria of adequacy for formalizations. I will come back to this
point below.
1 Treating inferences as sequences instead of pairs consisting of a set of premises and a conclusion is
more convenient for present purposes because it enables us to easily associate formulas with premises.
2 I will use standard zero- and first-order logic as examples of logical formalisms since they are
paradigmatic for the philosophical tradition I am referring to. However, what follows can be applied to
wide range of non-standard logics.
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2. The syntactical or semantical resources of the logical formalism are used to
give a proof which shows that the conclusion-formula is a valid consequence of
the premise-formulas.
3. The inference in question is judged to be valid by appeal to the proof given in
the preceding step. (If needed, this judgement can then be carried over to the
original argument.)
Against the background of this procedure, the question about the objects of logic
can now be framed more precisely. To begin with, we can think of proving validity
as a practical business and ask as what kind of objects premises and conclusions
enter this activity. If we leave aside the possibility that one may silently present
inferences to oneself, we can resolve this question by pointing out that inferences
can be given only as sequences of utterances, that is, sentence-tokens of some
physical make-up (since nothing depends on the medium, I do not distinguish
between utterances, inscriptions, digital patterns and so on).3 So utterances are the
objects one has to deal with when one goes about proving an inference. But in the
procedure described above, the utterances presenting the inference are present only
at the very beginning when they are to be replaced (in step 1) by formulas which are
then used as their proxies, so to speak, throughout the formal proof (step 2). From
this point of view, we can therefore say that formulas substitute for utterances. And
we may note that any answer to the question ‘‘What do formulas stand for?’’ which
does not refer to utterances will be incomplete.
But this should not be taken to imply that proofs of validity treat premises and
conclusions as utterances. In fact, as we shall see soon, it would clearly be mistaken
to think so. However, if premises and conclusions are not treated as utterances, as
what are they treated then? In Grandy’s words: ‘‘What do ‘Q’ and ‘R’ stand for?’’
Now, since formulas substitute for utterances in formal proofs, whatever about the
original utterances is relevant to such a proof must be reflected in the formulas
which are used in their place. We can therefore say that in logical proofs the
utterances which present the argument are treated as the kind of object formulas
stand for. This is the point where the debate about propositions, statements and so
on enters the scene. The positions staked out in this dispute can be understood in the
following way: claiming that the objects of logic are, for example, propositions
amounts to claiming that the utterances which present an argument are relevant to a
logical proof only insofar as they express certain propositions; in short, formulas
stand for propositions. Given such a position, one can still claim that formulas
substitute for utterances, namely those utterances which are suitably related to some
object the formula stands for. For the sake of clarity I do not use ‘‘stand for’’ but
introduce ‘‘substitute for’’ for this relation between formulas and utterances.4
3 Treating arguments in a publicly accessible medium as paradigm cases is characteristic for most
traditions of logic in philosophy, but it has not been uncontested. The main alternative consists in giving
theoretical primacy to mental states or acts, as can be found in some approaches which give judgements a
central role in logic (cf. Martin-Lo¨f 1996) or take Chomsky’s theories of language as their starting point
(cf. Collins 2003). Insofar as mental states or acts are singular events or objects, the points I make about
utterances can be transferred to such ‘‘mentalistic’’ conceptions of logic.
4 This use of ‘‘x substitutes for y’’ has do be distinguished from one that refers to replacing expressions
within the same language.
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(SF) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least one
x such that (i) x is an X and (ii) u stands in relation R to x and (iii) / stands for x.
‘‘X’’ and ‘‘R’’ in (SF) are placeholders for labels referring to certain objects and a
corresponding relation, respectively. The best known proposals for specifying ‘‘X’’
and ‘‘R’’ are ‘‘proposition’’ and ‘‘expresses’’, ‘‘sentence-type’’ and ‘‘is a token of’’,
and ‘‘utterance’’ and ‘‘is identical with’’.
If we consider once more the role formulas play in proofs of validity, we can
immediately derive an important restriction on what may be proposed as the objects
formulas stand for. A central reason for introducing formulas into logical proofs is
that proofs of validity are designed to show that an inference is valid not just for any
reason, but in virtue of a logical form of its premises and conclusion. By representing
logical forms, and only logical forms, of premises and conclusions, formulas
guarantee that logical proofs depend on nothing more or less than these logical forms.
Formulas therefore are required to stand only for such objects which have a logical
form that is represented by this formula. And since formulas must not represent
anything else besides logical forms, they will stand for all objects which have a
logical form represented by the formula. Using ‘‘X’’ once more as a placeholder for a
label which refers to the objects formulas stand for, this amounts to:
(LF) / stands for x iff / is a formula and x is an X and / represents a logical form
of x.
Drawing on (LF), the question ‘‘What do logical formulas stand for?’’ may be
related to the finding that premises and conclusions are always given as utterances
by introducing the following scheme, which is, given (LF), equivalent to (SF):
(S) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least
one x such that (i) x is an X and (ii) u stands in relation R to x and (iii) /
represents a logical form of x.
The question
(Q) What should be filled in for ‘‘X’’ and ‘‘R’’ in (S) and (LF)?
can now be used as an explication of ‘‘What do logical formulas stand for?’’ and the
less specific ‘‘What are the objects of logic?’’ On the one hand, this takes into
account the fact that defending Xs as the objects formulas stand for is of little help if
not accompanied by a specification of how utterances which present premises and
conclusions are related to these Xs. On the other hand, (S) leaves open the
possibility that formulas stand for utterances but, of course, (Q) can also be
answered by claiming that formulas stand for something else, say, propositions. In
this case, what (LF) and (S) yield can be paraphrased as: A formula stands for all
propositions which have a logical form represented by the formula and it substitutes
for all utterances which express such a proposition. I take this to be what is asserted
by the more colloquial claim that formulas stand for propositions.5
5 I leave open the question of whether and how the explication given here can be adapted to theories that
reject or substantially reinterpret the traditional account of logical proofs outlined above, as for example
LePore and Ludwig (2007).
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As made explicit in (S) and (LF), considerations about logical form will play a
crucial role in arguments for and against proposed answers to (Q). Several points are
worth noting about the relation representing a logical form of as used in this paper.
Firstly, logical forms are attributed to Xs in (S) and (LF). Consequently, (S) and (LF)
do not entitle us to talk about logical forms of utterances, unless we are going to defend
utterances as candidates for X. If a formula substitutes for an utterance, it does not
represent a logical form of this utterance, but only a logical form of an X this utterance
is R-related to, for example, a sentence-type this utterance is a token of. In short,
formulas represent logical forms of Xs, but they substitute for utterances. Secondly,
(S) and (LF) avoid the usual but misleading way of talking about the logical form of an
X, which disregards that they generally can be attributed multiple logical forms.
Ascribing logical forms is relative to a logical theory, and logical forms can be
analysed more or less fine-grained (see Brun 2004, Chap. 13, for more details). If, for
example, a premise has a first-order logical form represented by Fa ^ Ga, it also has a
first-order form that can be represented by Ha and zero-order forms represented by p
and by r ^ s. Hence all use of ‘‘logical form’’ is relative to a logical theory. And as a
consequence of the central role (LF) plays, this relativity affects the entire discussion
of the question about the objects of logic presented here. For the sake of simplicity, I
will refrain from indicating this explicitly. Thirdly, using the two-place predicate ‘‘/
represents a logical form of x’’ and its converse ‘‘x has a logical form represented by /’’
might suggest that logical forms are entities of some kind, different from both Xs and
formulas. This, however, I do not intend to imply. For one thing, I think the notion of
logical form is best analysed as referring not to any entities but to certain features of Xs
that are relevant to the validity of inferences involving these Xs. This includes, for
example, the way Xs can be analysed into constituents belonging to logically relevant
categories (e.g. Xs, n-ary predicates and singular terms), and the property of being true
or false represented by all formulas (cf. Brun 2004, Chaps. 1.2, 4). Yet the arguments
that will be discussed in the following sections do not depend on this position. They are
compatible with views that interpret logical forms as entities, patterns instantiated by
Xs for example (e.g. Lemmon 1987, pp. 4–5), or think of formulas as not representing
but being logical forms (e.g. Sainsbury 2001, p. 35). What points about logical forms
are really decisive for answering (Q) can be seen best when we investigate into the
reasons why the usual proposals are not viable.
2 The Usual Proposals
2.1 Utterances and Content
The main reason why utterances may seem a promising answer to (Q) are worries
about assigning truth-values to sentence-types. As it has been noted countless times,
the truth-value of a sentence-type is often highly context-dependent. ‘‘I am mad’’ may
well be true when uttered by the Cheshire Cat, but false when Alice says it. In contrast,
utterances are essentially context-bound. Therefore, if they can be attributed a truth-
value, it can be attributed absolutely. (Of course, not all utterances can be attributed a
truth value, but only those which are used to perform an appropriate speech act.
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However, utterances that present a premise or a conclusion are presupposed to meet
this condition.) This also supports the claim that utterances are the ‘‘primary’’6 bearers
of truth, while sentences have truth-values only derivatively (e.g. Davidson 1990,
p. 309). Now standard logic requires that whatever formulas stand for has exactly one
truth-value. In other words, candidates for X must respect the following condition:
(C1) Xs must have exactly one truth-value.
Having accepted these points, one may be tempted to claim that formulas stand
for utterances which have exactly one truth-value. R could then be specified as the
relation of identity. This turns (S) into:
(1) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least
one x such that (i) x is an utterance and x has exactly one truth-value and (ii) u
is identical with x and (iii) / represents a logical form of x.
This can be simplified to the equivalent:
(S.U) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and u has exactly
one truth-value and / represents a logical form of u.
A first difficulty with this line of argument is that it suggests the assumption that
if an utterance has a truth-value then it has exactly one such value. But this is not
correct if we count all sentence-tokens as utterances. Whether, for example, ‘‘I love
you’’ printed on a T-shirt is true still depends on the context, viz. who wears the
shirt and who reads the inscription and when. The problem can be eliminated if we
take ‘‘utterance’’ to refer to a particular use of a sentence-token (of any physical
make-up), what is sometimes labelled a ‘‘tokening’’ (Brandom 1994, pp. 451,
664n10). I will therefore use ‘‘utterance’’ in this sense and presuppose that (S) and
its instances are interpreted accordingly.
However, the idea that formulas stand for utterances faces an insurmountable
problem. We could not use formulas for proving the validity of even the most
simple inferences, such as instances of conjunction elimination. For the validity of
an inference formalized by
(2) p ^ q ) p
depends not only on its premise being a conjunction, but also on whatever we take
the conclusion-formula to stand for occurring in isolation and as a conjunct in the
premise. This means that proofs of validity generally depend on formulas standing
for something repeatable.7 But utterances as such are singular physical objects or
6 See Iacona (2002, Chap. 5.4) for various explications of primacy.
7 The argument can be generalized to all inferences of zero-order logic which do not involve constant
truth functions. See Hoyningen-Huene (2004, pp. 209–211).
Nolan (1969) has suggested an interpretation of formulas which would treat (2) as a claim about
utterances and their parts: every first conjunct of a true conjunction is true. This interpretation of (2)
evades the argument about repeatability by assuming that the conclusion-utterance is a part of the
premise-utterance and that generally all inferences formalizable by (2) consist of one (conjunctive)
utterance only. However, even if one were ready to adopt such an interpretation of (2), this would be of no
help for dealing with inferences that consist of two separate utterances, like all the usual examples of
conjunction elimination do.
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events, localized in space and time, and can therefore not occur more than once
(Grandy 1993, p. 55; Hoyningen-Huene 2004, pp. 116–117). The upshot is that
whatever formulas are going to stand for must satisfy this condition:
(C2) It must be possible that two non-identical utterances stand in relation R to the
same X.
The argument just given draws on an important point about the relations standing
for and representing a logical form of. If a formula contains the same sub-formula
more than once, then this repeated sub-formula must stand for the same object. And
the same goes for sub-formulas within a sequence of formulas. That means that
identity and difference8 of whatever formulas stand for count as an aspect of logical
form, even though the objects a formula stands for of course do not count as an
aspect of logical form (cf. Hoyningen-Huene 2004, pp. 40, 42, 43, 74).
This leads to a restriction on what formulas may stand for. On the one hand, we
expect atomic formulas of zero-order logic, such as p, to represent only a logical
form which is common to all Xs, irrespective of our choice of X. And consequently,
we expect such formulas to stand for all Xs and to substitute for all utterances which
are R-related to at least one X. On the other hand, this need not be correct for atomic
formulas which are sub-formulas of some formula. As an example we may take any
formula containing two occurrences of the same sub-formula, say p ? p. We must
not allow p ? p to stand for all Xs having a logical form of a conditional with two
constituents which are Xs. Rather, we should interpret p ? p as standing for all Xs
having a logical form of a conditional with two constituents which are identical Xs.
In general, if a sub-formula occurs more than once within a formula, then these two
sub-formulas must stand for the same X. Analogously, this point also applies to
sequences of formulas, such as (2). If single formulas are treated as sequences with
one member, the resulting restriction can be framed as follows:
(O) For all sequences of formulas R and all formulas /: if /1 and /2 are
occurrences of / in the members of R, /1 stands for an X x1 and /2 stands for
an X x2, then x1 and x2 must be identical.
More colloquially, (O) requires that all occurrences of the same formula in a
sequence of formulas stand for the same X.
Despite the problems just discussed, there might be some motivation for trying to
rescue the claim that formulas stand for utterances. In addition to the reasons
mentioned in connection with (C1), attributing logical forms to utterances would
permit for a simpler explication of the question about the objects of logic, avoiding
the complications Xs introduce. Ontological qualms about X-entities may be
considered another reason for doing away with them. Finally, it might be possible to
relax restriction (O) in such a way that the problems with repeatability can be
evaded. In the rest of this section, I will therefore examine an alternative approach
to dealing with ‘‘What do logical formulas stand for?’’ based on such considerations.
8 Strictly speaking, there is an asymmetry here. Treating two different Xs as identical may lead to
incorrect ‘‘proofs’’ of invalid inferences, whereas treating two occurrences of the same X as different will
only result in giving away some proofs of valid inferences.
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If logical forms are attributed directly to utterances, X and R can be eliminated
from (S) and (LF). Taking into account (C1), we get:
(U) / substitutes/stands for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and u has
exactly one truth-value and / represents a logical form of u.
Consequently, distinguishing substituting for from standing for becomes pointless,
as (U) shows. Next, we also need to replace (O) with a principle not involving X:
(O*) For all sequences of formulas R and all formulas /: if /1 and /2 are
occurrences of / in the members of R, /1 stands for an utterance u1 and /2
stands for an utterance u2, then u1 and u2 must stand in relation S (where ‘‘S’’
is a placeholder for a label referring to an appropriate relation of sameness
between utterances).
To avoid the troubles with repeatability, S must now be specified as a relation of
sameness that can hold between utterances that are not identical. Such a relation
can be provided by introducing an appropriate notion of ‘‘content’’. One can then
say that what matters for the validity of inferences formalized by (2) is not
exhausted by the requirement that they all have a premise featuring a conjunction
but also turns on the conclusion and the first conjunct having the same content. In
short, while content itself does not count as an aspect of logical form, identity and
difference of content do. What this exactly amounts to depends on how we define
‘‘content’’.
As a first try, we can experiment with a simple approach and treat contents as a
kind of ‘‘complement’’ of logical forms by stipulating that, given a logical form of
an utterance, ‘‘content’’ refers to all aspects of this utterance which do not count as
aspects of the logical form in question (see e.g. Hoyningen-Huene 2004, p. 11). But
once more we could not have any utterances with a logical form represented by, say,
p _ :p. For the complement of a logical form of an utterance is no more repeatable
than the utterance itself.9 The only way to evade this problem is to introduce a
notion of content which secures the possibility that distinct utterances may have the
same content. So the price we have to pay for eliminating Xs is that we now need a
substantial account of content.
But there is an additional problem for the claim that formulas stand for
utterances. Its range of application is far too restricted. Consider a typical
formalization, such as:
(3) Either Alf or Beth will win.
Beth won’t win.
Alf will win.
(4) p _ q; :q ) p
If we assume that formulas stand for utterances, what exactly do the first p and the
second q in (4) stand for? Perhaps one could claim that p stands for the discontinuous
9 Even though the complement-definition of content is of little help if applied to utterances, it may be
useful if applied to some other Xs.
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utterance ‘‘Alf will win’’, which is partly shared by the utterance ‘‘Beth will win’’.
But this seems quite far-fetched and for q there is simply no utterance ‘‘Beth will
win’’ to be found in the second line of (3). Suggesting that formulas might also stand
for parts of utterances does not really fare better. It seems absurd to claim that the
first p stands just for ‘‘Alf’’ and the second q for, well, ‘‘Beth w… win’’? Another
counter to these difficulties is to claim that only entire formulas stand for something,
while proper sub-formulas do not. However, this is not only implausible, but such a
position would largely give up the original question. In order to avoid that, one could
lastly deny that the formulas in (4) stand for the utterances in (3) and claim that
strictly speaking they can stand only for utterances such as:
(5) Either Alf will win or Beth will win.
It is not the case that Beth will win.
Alf will win.
This line of argument also calls for a modification of the procedure for proving
validity described above. If problems similar to those illustrated by (3) should not
exclude most inferences from being formalized, one has to make sure that they are
properly set up by preceding argument analysis. This, however, is a rather
unwelcome consequence. Delegating a great deal of logical analysis to pre-
theoretical treatment is too high a price for an answer to the question about the
objects of logic, at least as long as there are alternatives.
2.2 Propositions and Meaning
The most popular answer to (Q) identifies Xs as propositions and explains R as the
relation of expression between utterances and propositions:
(S.P) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least
one x such that (i) x is a proposition and (ii) u expresses x and (iii) /
represents a logical form of x.
However, ‘‘proposition’’ covers many different notions, including some which have
originally been introduced under another label, such as ‘‘statement’’ (Strawson
1952) or ‘‘thought’’ (Frege 1918). To simplify matters, I will use ‘‘proposition’’
throughout, ignore terminological differences and arrange the discussion about
various notions of propositions according to distinctions which are relevant to their
being defensible as answers to (Q). To begin with, we may consider a typical use of
the term ‘‘proposition’’, such as:
Now it seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two
sentences ‘‘Socrates is wise’’, ‘‘Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates’’ assert
the same fact and express the same proposition. They are not, of course, the
same sentence, but they have the same meaning, just as two sentences in two
different languages can have the same meaning. […] whichever we say we
mean the same thing. Now of one of these sentences ‘‘Socrates’’ is the subject,
of the other ‘‘wisdom’’; and so which of the two is subject, which predicate,
depends upon what particular sentence we use to express our proposition, and
10 G. Brun
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has nothing to do with the logical nature of Socrates or wisdom, but is a matter
entirely for grammarians. (Ramsey 1925, p. 12)
Ramsey’s idea is clear enough. Roughly speaking, a proposition is the meaning
expressed by an utterance. More specifically, the following properties are usually
attributed to propositions: (i) They are true or false. (ii) The same proposition can
be expressed by different utterances. (iii) Propositions are entities not only different
from utterances, but of a different kind. They are not individuated by reference to
space and time, and in this sense they are abstract entities. (iv) Utterances express
the same proposition if they have the same meaning, say the same thing, or have the
same semantic content (in short, if they are ‘‘synonymous’’). (v) The same
proposition can be expressed using sentences which differ linguistically. Properties
(i) and (ii) mean that propositions meet conditions (C1) and (C2). Hence they must
be adopted by all who defend propositions as the objects formulas stand for.
Important differences between various notions of propositions relate to properties
(iii), (iv) and (v). What kind of entities are propositions? And in particular, are they
structured? Under what conditions do utterances count as expressing the same
meaning or saying the same thing? What does indifference to linguistic variance
amount to? In the present context, the last two questions are the crucial ones. They
concern the relation R between utterances and the propositions they express; that is,
the conditions which decide whether two utterances count as the same X if
propositions are going to play the role of X. In principle, this issue is independent of
the ontological question about the nature of propositions. Specifically, the
conditions that determine whether two utterances express the same proposition
can be sensitive to the linguistic structure of the utterances, even if propositions
themselves have a completely different structure or no structure at all. In this
section, I shall concentrate on the idea that equivalence in meaning is a sufficient
condition for identity of proposition expressed and that this implies that utterances
which are not utterances of the same sentence can express the same proposition in
virtue of being logically equivalent or of featuring synonymous expressions (see
Sect. 2.4 for other notions of proposition).10 In Carnap’s (1956, Sects. 6, 14)
terminology, two utterances express the same proposition if they are L-equivalent
(in contradistinction to: if they are intensionally isomorphic). The probably best-
known account of propositions with these properties is Stalnaker’s (1976, 1984)
proposal to identify propositions with functions from possible worlds to truth-values
or with sets of possible worlds.11 Alternative accounts rely on other criteria for the
identity of propositions, such as: two utterances express the same proposition if they
have identical truth-conditions, assertibility-conditions or inferential role.
Understood this way, propositions promise to do away with all aspects of
utterances which are logically irrelevant, specifically, properties of physical
realization as well as peculiarities of linguistic expression. Instead they partition
10 Frege explicitly formulated this criterion, among others (see Penco 2003).
11 Whether Stalnaker himself would propose to answer (Q) with reference to propositions is less clear.
On the one hand, he takes propositions to have logical structures and to stand in logical relations, such as
entailment (1984, p. 10). On the other hand, he treats statements about logical equivalence as a statements
about relations between sentences (1984, p. 72).
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utterances into semantically relevant equivalence classes. The trouble with the
identity criteria mentioned is that they have a tendency to be too generous. Two
problems shall be mentioned (cf. Grandy 1993, pp. 53–54).
Firstly, according to the criteria mentioned both of the couples
(6.1) Jack went up the hill and Jill went up the hill.
(6.2) Jill went up the hill and Jack went up the hill.
(7.1) Not all Martians are green.
(7.2) Some Martians are not green.
consist of two utterances expressing the same proposition. But there is an important
difference between these and Ramsey’s example. The equivalence in both (6) and
(7) clearly has not only ‘‘grammatical’’ but logical reasons, commutativity of
conjunction in (6) and relations between quantifiers and negation in (7). This raises
the following problem: if formulas stood for propositions, then all equivalences
would have a trivial proof; that is, we would never need more than a proof that all
instances of
(8) / , /
are valid. This undesirable result is not restricted to proofs of equivalence, but can
similarly affect other proofs as well. One could, for example, bypass first order logic
in the proof of
(9) If not all Martians are green, there are minorities on Mars.
Some Martians are not green.
There are minorities on Mars.
by treating it as an instance of modus ponens. If we are not ready to accept such
unnecessarily trivial proofs, we must not treat logical equivalence as a sufficient
condition for identity of logical form (cf. Davidson 1980, p. 145).
A second problem arises if we assume, for example, that in virtue of synonymy
the following two utterances express the same proposition:
(10.1) Donald is a drake.
(10.2) Donald is male duck.
Then we could formalize
(11) Donald is a drake.
Donald is a duck.
(using F, G and a for ‘‘male’’, ‘‘duck’’ and ‘‘Donald’’ respectively) as
(12) Fa ^ Ga ) Ga
and ‘‘show’’ the validity of (11) by using conjunction elimination alone. Unless one
is willing to accept the claim that all valid inferences are formally valid (as proposed
in, for example, Wittgenstein 1922), this constitutes a fatal problem for the position
that formulas stand for propositions. It opens the door to mock proofs for materially
valid inferences. While in the preceding examples logical proofs are trivialized, we
12 G. Brun
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here face the problem that propositions enable us to show inferences as truth
functionally valid which we consider to be truth functionally invalid.
The conclusion to be drawn is that we cannot understand formulas as standing for
propositions in the sense discussed here. The criteria deciding whether two
utterances express the same proposition would force us to accept unnecessary trivial
and even incorrect proofs. The reason for this failure is that some of the allegedly
‘‘grammatical’’ features of utterances are in fact relevant to logic, but the notions of
proposition under consideration ignore them. As a further condition for answering
(Q) we can therefore introduce:
(C3) Logical equivalence and synonymy of two non-identical utterances must not
be sufficient conditions for their standing in relation R to the same X.
It is important to note that the appeal to logical equivalence in (C3) introduces an
implicit reference to the logical theories we consider relevant to the application of
(C3). For example, the above argument against treating (9) as an instance of modus
ponens turns on the fact that a more sophisticated analysis is available in first order
logic. But if we imagine that propositional logic was the only logical theory we had,
proving (9) as an instance of modus ponens would be as acceptable as using the
same formula for the following two utterances (cf. Davidson 1963, p. 349):
(13.1) Jack and Jill went up the hill.
(13.2) Jack went up the hill and Jill went up the hill.
Additionally, the formulation of (C3) is relatively cautious. It leaves open the
possibility that under certain conditions two equivalent or synonymous expressions
can count as the same X. The reason is that in standard practice of first-order logic
not all synonymous expressions are treated in the same way. Whereas proving (11)
by means of (12) is considered unacceptable, it is routine to follow Frege (1918, pp.
63–64) in formalizing inferences like (14) with (15):
(14) Every horse is an animal.
Rosinante is a steed.
Rosinante is an animal.
(15) 8xðFx ! GxÞ; Fa ) Ga
One may well wonder whether this practice can be justified by a sound principle.
However, in the present context that issue may remain unresolved, since no stronger
principle than (C3) is needed for ruling out answers to (Q) which lead to the
‘‘proofs’’ we found objectionable.
2.3 Sentences and Linguistic Structure
The arguments presented in the previous section have shown that at least some
linguistic differences between equivalent utterances are relevant to the question
whether they should count as the same X. This provides some motivation for
proposing that formulas stand for sentence-types (sentences, for short). Sentence-
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types seem to be promising, since qua types they are repeatable and qua sentences
they are linguistic entities which do not eliminate the differences in structure we
found being relevant to logic. But of course not all sentences qualify as objects
formulas may stand for, but only those which are true or false (C1). The claim that
formulas stand for sentences is therefore to be understood as restricted to sentences
which have exactly one truth-value according to some criterion (T):
(S.S) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least
one x such that (i) x is a sentence-type and x has exactly one truth-value
according to (T) and (ii) u is a token of x and (iii) / represents a logical form
of x.
Before going into any detail, it may be worth noting that explicating the type-
token relationship is far from trivial (see e.g. Goodman 1976, Chaps. IV.2–3;
Kaplan 1990, pp. 96–110). Nevertheless, I will follow common practice and
presuppose that an utterly unambitious syntactical criterion like the same words in
the same order does the job of deciding whether two utterances are tokens of the
same type. After all, the problem of an exact definition of ‘‘sentence-type’’ is a
rather pervasive one. It affects most theories which refer in some way to utterances
and in particular all proposals for answering (Q), as soon as one tries to specify the
relation R between utterances and the objects formulas stand for (unless ‘‘X’’ and
‘‘R’’ are specified as ‘‘utterance’’ and ‘‘is identical with’’).
Proposing sentences as Xs faces two classes of problems, one well-known, one
mostly overlooked. The first class of problems concerns the specification of (T). It is
the basis for a popular objection against sentences which draws on (C1). The
argument is mostly the same as the one which has already been portrayed as
supporting utterances. Since the truth-value of a majority of sentences is context-
dependent, their truth-values—if they are going to have a truth-value at all—must
be derived from utterances by appeal to a principle such as:
(T.1) A sentence is true iff all its utterances are true and it is false iff if all its
utterances are false.12
But this means that most (or even all) sentences cannot be assigned a truth-value,
because either some of their utterances cannot be classified as true or false, or not all
their utterances have the same truth-value.
The first difficulty is mainly caused by vague or ambivalent utterances which
cannot straightforwardly be assigned a truth-value. The examples are notorious:
(16) The journey from Rome to Vienna takes a long time. (How much time is
‘‘long’’?)
(17) I’ve forgotten about the bill. (An invoice, a theatre program, an act of
legislation?)
12 Some defenders of propositions claim that utterances have truth-values only in virtue of expressing
propositions. This turns (T.1) into: A sentence is true iff all its utterances express a true proposition and it
is false iff if all its utterances express a false proposition. Since the following arguments do not depend on
whether utterances have their truth-value ascribed directly or derived from the propositions they express, I
will confine myself to the simpler picture without propositions.
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The second difficulty arises because for most sentences the truth-value of their
tokens depends on (linguistic and factual) context. Therefore, there is in general no
guarantee that they have the same truth-value. This is most obviously the case if an
utterance contains indexicals, such as ‘‘here’’, ‘‘yesterday’’, ‘‘you’’, ‘‘this’’ etc, but it
also concerns, for example, most sentences containing proper names.13 Whether
(18) George is president.
is true, depends, inter alia, on who ‘‘George’’ refers to in this particular utterance.
Quine has defended two solutions to these problems with (T.1). The more radical
one consists in resorting to ‘‘eternal sentences’’ (Quine 1960, Sect. 40; foreshad-
owed in Frege 1969, pp. 146–147/134–135). This amounts to claiming that formulas
cannot stand for all sentences, but only for those which qualify as true or false
according to (T.1); that is, for sentences which are neither ambiguous nor vague nor
context-dependent. Consequently, in most cases utterances have to be prepared
before logical analysis can start. Indexicals have to be tuned up with contextual
information and ambiguous or vague expressions have to be eliminated. This idea
faces at least three problems. It is far from clear that indexical elements, vagueness
and ambiguity can always be completely eliminated. More importantly, it is not
clear under what conditions exactly a sentence counts as free from context
dependency, vagueness and ambiguity. Finally, it has been argued (e.g. Perry 1979)
that there are ‘‘essential indexicals’’, which cannot be eliminated without a
substantial change in meaning.
Fortunately, we do not need to enter into these questions, since the strategy of
eternalizing is overkill anyway. As Quine (1960, p. 227, 1982, pp. 55–57) has
argued, the problems challenging sentences can be solved without insisting on them
being unaffected by vagueness, ambiguity and context dependency. Take for
example the two inferences:
(19) If this is true, then I am a nurse.
This is true.
I am a nurse.
(20) Nice food is not cheap.
Cheap food is not nice.
It is irrelevant to the formal validity of (19) what the referents of ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘this’’ are,
as long as they are guaranteed to remain constant within (19). Similarly, we do not
need to know what counts as ‘‘nice’’ or as ‘‘cheap’’ food in order to establish the
validity of (20), as long as we can assume that the terms are used in the same way in
premise and conclusion. The reason is, that logical validity of an inference is solely
dependent on its logical form. This means that (19) can be understood as an instance
of modus ponens, provided the ‘‘content’’ of the two occurrences of ‘‘this is true’’
and ‘‘I am a nurse’’ is guaranteed to be the same, irrespective of what this
13 The category of indexicals is here to be understood in a broad sense, so that it includes not only
expressions whose meaning is dependent on the circumstances of utterance, but also relative pronouns
and other anaphoric or cataphoric expressions.
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content is.14 Analogously this is true for the terms and their referents in (20). The
upshot is that we do not need to eliminate context-dependency, vagueness and
ambiguity; it is enough to eliminate equivocation within the context of an inference.
This makes it possible for formulas to stand for all sentences, as long as we can
guarantee that no equivocation results. The proposal can be worked out in two steps.
First, we generally ban the fallacy of equivocation:
(E) Within an inference, tokens of the same type must have the same semantic
value.
Secondly, we replace (T.1) by
(T.2) In the context of an inference i, a sentence is true iff all its utterances in i are
true and it is false iff all its utterances in i are false.
Taken together, (E) and (T.2) promise to turn sentences into a candidate for
answering (Q) which meets all conditions discussed so far. It may in certain cases be
difficult to enforce (E), but it is, by orders of magnitude, more realistic than insisting
on eternal sentences. However, this solution comes at a price. Since (T.2) is
relativized to the context of an inference, working out this proposal requires to
relativize ‘‘substitutes for’’ in (S) and (S.S) as well. And whether a given sentence is
something a formula can stand for can be decided only within the context of an
inference.15 This price may well be worth paying but, unfortunately, (E) is rather
superficial. It is too strong, for we need not require that all tokens of the same type
have the same semantic value, but only corresponding ones. Applying (E) to ‘‘it’’ in
the following would be nonsense:
(21) If it is getting cold I will either cover the exotic plants myself or convince you
to do it.
However, (E) is also not strong enough, for it addresses neither syntactical
ambiguities nor ambiguities of expressions directly relevant to logical form. (Many
textbooks treat ‘‘either… or… ’’ in sentences such as (21) as inducing an ambiguity
of logical form, but see LePore 2000, pp. 77–79.) As a consequence, (E) needs to be
replaced by a more ambitious principle which refers (at least, see Grandy 1993,
pp. 57–58) to syntactic structures of sentences.
But once more, we do not need to address these problems here, because there is a
second, independent class of problems challenging sentences as the objects formulas
stand for. In spite of being much simpler, these problems have got much less
attention (cf. again Grandy 1993, pp. 58–60). All proposals considered so far use a
notion of sentence that has identity criteria which are far too fine-grained for the
purpose at hand. For example:
14 Just some guarantee that both occurrences have the same truth-value is not enough. Even if all
utterances of, for example, ‘‘I am here now’’ must be true regardless of context (Kaplan 1989), it does not
follow that all inferences from one utterance of this sentence to another one can be formalized as
instances of / ) /. In fact, such a formalization constitutes a fallacy of equivocation unless the two
utterances are produced simultaneously by the same person.
15 We could therefore say, that being an X is a role sentences can play, quite analogous to other roles they
may play, such as being a premise or a conclusion.
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(22) If the letter is not stamped you will be charged extra.
The letter is unstamped.
You will be charged extra.
If we did take formulas as standing for sentences, then (22) could not count as an
instance of modus ponens. For the two inscriptions in italics are not tokens of the
same sentence-type according to any orthodox definition of sentence-type. Matters
get even worse if we turn to a language with a systematic difference in word order
between main clauses and subordinate clauses. It is, for example, extremely difficult
to find even one example of an inference instantiating modus ponens in German (cf.
Frege 1969, pp. 281/261–262), if we assume that formulas stand for sentences:
(23) Wenn Schnee weiß ist, dann ist Gras gru¨n.
Schnee ist weiß.
Gras ist gru¨n.
It is quite obvious that these two examples are only the tip of an iceberg
(inference (3) is another case in point). The position that formulas stand for
sentences simply is not compatible with standard logical practice. The reason is that
logically completely irrelevant aspects of linguistic expression count as differences
in sentence-type. This result is just the opposite of what propositions do, namely,
eliminate all ‘‘grammatical’’ differences. So we still face the challenge to find
criteria for treating utterances as R-related to the same X which allow us to ignore
some, but not all linguistic differences.
One intuitively appealing strategy for coping with the problems just discussed is
to resort to syntax for introducing some entities which are closely related to
sentences but whose criteria of identity are not as sensitive to linguistic detail as
those of sentence-types. It is, for example, reasonable to expect that a better result
could be achieved by uniting sentence-types which can be derived from a common
syntactic representation or from one another by certain syntactical transformations.
Although such an approach could eliminate the problems exemplified in (23), syntax
alone will not suffice for dealing with problems like (22). Semantical information
about the meaning of specific words is involved in deciding that (22) is an instance
of modus ponens, in contrast to, for example:
(24) If the dock workers are unionized they will join the strike.
The dock workers are not ionized.
The dock workers will join the strike.
All in all, one may hope that with a more or less full-fledged linguistic analysis one
would be in a position to decide whether two sentences count as the same X.
Nevertheless, linguistic analysis as such is not what we are after when trying to
answer (Q). What we really need to know at this point is: how can we distinguish
logically relevant from logically irrelevant features of linguistic expression? We
therefore need, in addition to a sufficiently detailed linguistic analysis of sentences,
some rules for deciding on basis of such an analysis whether two sentences count as
the same X. And which linguistic features are relevant to such decisions depends on
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the logical theories we are taking into account. So what is really needed is a
proposal that respects the following condition:
(C4) Logically irrelevant linguistic differences between utterances must not be a
sufficient condition for their not standing in relation R to the same X.
As (C3), condition (C4) is to be understood as implicitly relative to the logical
theories we consider relevant to its application.
The problem with condition (C4), of course, is that it is useless without spelling
out what ‘‘logically relevant’’ means. This challenge can be made more clear, if we
make use of the fact that one rationale for introducing (LF) and (S) was to secure
that a formula stands for exactly those Xs which have a logical form represented by
that formula. Since logical forms are all that matters for the relationship between
formulas and Xs, we can identify the logically relevant linguistic differences
between sentences as those differences which, in a given logical theory, count as
aspects of logical form. Equivalently, we can define that two sentences must count
as different Xs if and only if their tokens cannot all be given identical adequate
formalizations. It thereby becomes clear that working out the details behind (C4)
amounts to giving a theory of formalization. I take this to be a strong reason against
the strategy of expecting that linguistics is bound to come up with a viable proposal
for answering (Q)—unless it is at least implicitly guided by logical considerations;
that is, it is a theory of formalization in linguistic terms.
This interconnection between (Q) and formalization becomes even more apparent
if we investigate some further strategies for answering (Q) drawing directly upon
logic.
2.4 Propositions and Logical Form
Several proposals are available if we seek an answer to (Q) based on logical
considerations. I will discuss three closely related approaches. A first option is to
focus on logical practice and ask, for example: if we are given a formula, how do we
go about finding out what utterances it substitutes for? For this process, which I call
‘‘verbalization’’, one can follow a fairly established recipe. Kalish et al. (1980, pp.
9–11, 53–57, 129–130, 209–211, 264–266, 315–316) give a description which
involves three steps. If, for example, we have
(25) 8xðFx ! GxÞ ! :p
we first need to decide how the non-logical symbols should be interpreted. So we
need a correspondence scheme; that is, a table that specifies for each non-logical
symbol a unique reading.16 For example:
(25.1) Fx: x is a whale; Gx: x is a mammal; p: Moby Dick is a fish
For reasons that soon will become obvious, I call an ordered pair of a formula and a
correspondence scheme a ‘‘formalization’’.
16 ‘‘Correspondence scheme’’ is Sainsbury’s term (2001, p. 51). Kalish et al. use ‘‘scheme of
abbreviation’’ (1980, p. 8).
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In the second step, the formalization is ‘‘read’’. The result (understood as a type
rather than a token) is called a ‘‘literal verbalization’’:
(25.2) (If for each x (if x is a whale, then x is a mammal), then it is not the case
that Moby Dick is a fish).
Most literal verbalizations cannot count as sentences of an ordinary language
because they are grammatically deviant or include remains of logical symbolism,
such as brackets for grouping and variables for cross-referencing. But we can, in a
third step, paraphrase a literal verbalization to get an ordinary language expression,
which is a ‘‘free verbalization’’:
(25.3) If all whales are mammals, then Moby Dick is not a fish.
One should, of course, go on and define more exactly the two notions of
verbalization involved. This is relatively easy for literal verbalizations. In fact,
Kalish et al. give effective rules for literal verbalizations. And in principle, there is
no reason why this could not be done in a way that secures that every formalization
has exactly one literal verbalization. However, to give a definition of ‘‘free
verbalization’’ seems pretty hopeless. It would amount to giving a precise account
of the notoriously vague term ‘‘paraphrase’’.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to see how these notions could be used for
answering (Q). The obvious idea is to claim that a formula substitutes for all
utterances which are tokens of a literal or free verbalization of some formalization
with this formula. Since all verbalizations are paraphrases of literal verbalizations,
this amounts to:
(S.V) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at
least one x such that (i) x is a literal verbalization of some formalization
with formula / and (ii) u is a token of a paraphrase of x.
To meet requirement (O) we may insist that sequences of formulas are verbalized
using one correspondence scheme only. (S), on the other hand, yields (26) if ‘‘X’’ is
specified as ‘‘is a literal verbalization of some formalization’’ and ‘‘R’’ as ‘‘is a token
of a paraphrase of’’:
(26) / substitutes for u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and there is at least
one x such that (i) x is a literal verbalization of some formalization and (ii) u
is a token of a paraphrase of x and (iii) / represents a logical form of x.
This, however, is equivalent to (S.V), provided we accept that formulas represent
logical forms of ‘‘their’’ literal verbalizations:
(27) / represents a logical form of x iff there is a y such that (i) y is a
formalization with formula / and (ii) x is a literal verbalization of y; in short,
iff x is a literal verbalization of some formalization with formula /.
As candidates for answering (Q), literal verbalizations are an improvement on
sentences. They are on a par with respect to repeatability (C2), and assigning truth-
values to literal verbalizations leads to the same questions as it does with sentences
(C1). If we leave aside the issue of (E) and (T.2), two important points remain.
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Firstly, literal verbalizations can be different but yet logically equivalent (C3) if
they are introduced by rules that guarantee that different literal verbalizations are
assigned to structurally different formulas (cf. the rules in Kalish et al. 1980).
Secondly, nothing stands in the way of defining the relation R between utterances
and literal verbalizations in such a manner that logically irrelevant linguistic
differences between utterances do not imply that they have to be assigned to
different literal verbalizations (C4).
Now this proposal will be as good as the explication we can give for
‘‘paraphrase’’ (as well as for ‘‘correspondence scheme’’ and ‘‘literal verbalization’’).
Furthermore, we do not need just any account of paraphrasing, but one which gives
us the right results when used in (S.V). This is certainly not the case if we take the
term ‘‘paraphrase’’ as ordinarily used. For in this sense, equivalences, such as
(7.1) Not all Martians are green.
(7.2) Some Martians are not green.
are perfect examples of paraphrases. Besides not being properly defined, such a
notion of paraphrase would threaten to lead us into exactly the same problems as we
encountered with propositions. Instead, we need a notion of paraphrase which is
sensitive to logical form but does not rely on logical equivalence or synonymy. All
in all, it seems that there is really not much to gain from turning to verbalizations.
For sure, literal verbalizations allow for precise definition, but introducing
paraphrases results in replacing the question ‘‘What do logical formulas stand
for?’’ with ‘‘What counts as a paraphrase of a literal verbalization?’’ Since literal
verbalizations are little more than verbose formulas, there is really not much of a
difference between this question and ‘‘What counts as an adequate formalization of
an utterance?’’
This point can be reinforced if we turn to the second approach, switch our
perspective and ask how in the common practice of logic one finds out which
formulas can be substituted for a given inference; in short, how one ‘‘formalizes’’.
There is a striking analogy between the process of verbalization and the procedures
of formalizing which are described in textbooks by those authors who care about
formalization (e.g. Epstein 2001; Lampert 2005; see also Blau 1977). Indeed, what
they suggest comes very close to inverting verbalization. According to such
explanations, formalization can be done, and often is done, in two steps. Firstly, the
utterance in question is replaced by an expression which is more perspicuous with
respect to logical form. Secondly, a formula is assigned to the ‘‘explicit version’’ or
‘‘standardized text’’ resulting from the first step. There are various proposals on
offer for the first step. While, for example, Blau (1977, pp. 4–6) gives a relatively
informal characterization, Lampert (2005, Chaps. 3.1, 9.1) and Kalish et al. (1980;
see beginning of this section) provide at least rules that determine which expressions
count as explicit versions, although these rules are silent on the question which
expressions count as explicit versions of which utterances. Additionally, Lampert
gives rules for the second step from explicit versions to formulas.
For later use, we may note additionally that the result of formalizing should be
taken to be a formalization, not only a formula, or else it would not generally be
possible to tell adequate formalizations from inadequate ones. The following, for
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example, becomes inadequate if p and q are switched either in the correspondence
scheme or in the formula (but not in both), as well as if one of the sentences in the
correspondence scheme is replaced by another one, such as ‘‘Vladimir swears’’:
(28) Pozzo loves smoking, but Estragon does not.
(29) p ^ :q p: Pozzo loves smoking; q: Estragon loves smoking
Without going into further details of the above-mentioned accounts of
formalization, it quickly becomes clear that explicit versions will turn out not to
be substantially different from literal verbalizations as soon as one tries to define
them strictly (this is explicitly so in Kalish et al. 1980, see pp. 11–12). Moreover,
the first step obviously consists in paraphrasing once more. Consequently, these
procedures of formalization really boil down to the converse of verbalization and we
do not get a new answer to (Q). The crucial problem with explicit versions is the
same as with literal verbalizations: no detailed account of the relationship R
between utterances and explicit versions (or literal verbalizations) is available.
Similar virtues and vices can be found in many theories of propositions, which
are the third approach discussed in this section. The currently prevailing view is that
propositions are entities which are not only true or false, but structured in a logically
relevant way (see e.g. the survey in King 2005). In the most simple cases, their
structures are just logical forms, as for example in Carnap’s (1956, Sect. 14)
account based on intensional isomorphism. More often, these structures are not
logical forms of standard first-order logic, but more fine-grained relatives thereof
(e.g. Cresswell 1985; Soames 1987; Zalta 1988; Menzel 1993). Other theories
exploit Chomsky’s LF (Logical Form), a syntactic structure closely related to
logical form (e.g. Higginbotham 1991; Larson and Ludlow 1993; King 1995).17 The
essential point for present purposes is that all these theories use criteria for assigning
propositions to utterances which are sensitive to logical forms. Consequently, there
are important differences to the accounts discussed in Sect. 2.2, although the
resulting proposal to answer (Q) is again framed in terms of propositions expressed
by utterances, just as in (S.P). The concepts of proposition mentioned here, meet not
only (C1) and (C2), but (C3) as well. In fact, differentiating between logically
equivalent utterances is a major motivation for introducing these notions in the first
place. Nevertheless, as potential answers to (Q) they are facing two challenges.18
First, recent theories of propositions introduce this notion not primarily as an
answer to (Q), if at all, but as the objects we relate to in propositional attitudes. But
this use of propositions is irrelevant for the question whether they can be defended
17 Importantly, even though LF is closely related to logical forms of generalized quantifier theory, it is a
syntactic structure which is part of Chomsky’s program of naturalizing linguistics. As such it answers to
principles which are not logical: properties of LF are ‘‘not to be settled in terms of considerations of valid
inference and the like’’ (Chomsky 1986, p. 205n, cf. pp. 67, 156). It therefore is an empirical question,
whether and in what respects Logical Forms can be equated with logical forms, in spite of widespread use
of LF for addressing logical problems.
18 There are also theories which hold that propositions themselves are unstructured entities even though
logical forms play a crucial role in deciding what proposition(s) an utterance expresses (e.g. Bealer 1993).
If this implies that propositions do not have logical forms, they cannot be what formulas stand for
according to (LF). If not, such unstructured propositions raise the same problems as those structured by
logical forms.
Formalization and the Objects of Logic 21
123
as an answer to (Q). Moreover, it leads to problems with condition (C4) (cf. Richard
1990, pp. 171–173; Salmon 1992; King 1996). The reason is that identity conditions
for propositions as objects of propositional attitudes are extremely fine-grained and
include aspects of utterances which are standardly considered irrelevant to logical
inference when these utterances are not used in propositional attitude-contexts. (30)
and (31), for example, each consist of a pair of utterances which accepted practice
counts as the same X while denying that they entail each other when prefixed by
‘‘Alfreda believes that’’:
(30.1) Rosinante is a horse.
(30.1) Rosinante is a steed.
(31.1) The letter is not stamped.
(31.1) The letter is unstamped.
Consequently, for answering (Q) we need an account of propositions that is not
tailored to propositional attitude-contexts and the fine-grained distinctions they
require, but one that takes, for example, standard first-order logical form as a criterion
for deciding whether two utterances express the same proposition. In fact, I think, this
is what logicians usually have in mind when they claim that formulas stand for
propositions. And this proposal comes extremely close to the first two approaches
discussed earlier in this section. As long as we restrict ourselves to question (Q), I can
see no reason why one should not treat literal verbalizations as standard expressions
of propositions or simply identify propositions with literal verbalizations.
Irrespective of such an identification, most theories of propositions leave us with
a second problem, quite similar to the difficulties with literal verbalizations and
explicit versions. As the two placeholders ‘‘X’’ and ‘‘R’’ in (S) make explicit,
answering (Q) involves a double task. It requires us to identify not only some
objects X, but also to specify their relation R to utterances. Therefore, proposing
some notion of proposition as an answer to (Q) is not enough. As long as the relation
R, expresses, is not spelled out in sufficient detail, such a proposal does not much
more than giving the problem a new label. This lacuna affects most current theories
of propositions, the major exception being accounts derived from Chomsky’s theory
of LF, such as Larson and Segal (1995).
A great deal of mainstream logic takes this as a motivation to stick to answering
(Q) with propositions structured by logical forms and to simply admit that we do not
have a sufficiently detailed account of a corresponding relation R. After all, many,
or perhaps most, logicians are simply convinced that it is extremely difficult or even
impossible on principled grounds to come up with anything like a precise account of
formalization; that is, of how logical formulas can be assigned to expressions of
ordinary language. Given that propositions structured by logical forms are close
relatives of formulas in the same manner that literal verbalizations and explicit
versions are, the difficulties in explaining the relation of any of these to utterances
are comparable. There is an obvious reason for this being so: insofar as propositions
have a structure which cannot be defined without, at least implicitly, appealing to
logical forms, they are not only closely related to formulas, but simply parasitic
upon formalizations; without the help of a logical formalism we had no clue about
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how to define them. In fact, the two projects of answering (Q) with appeal to
logically structured propositions and of giving an account of formalization are so
closely related, that the solution of one problem could be used for solving the other
one. If we had an account not only of the relation R* between propositions and
formalizations (analogous to the rules in Kalish et al. 1980; Lampert 2005), but of R
as well, then we could straightforwardly introduce the following definition: A
formalization U is an adequate formalization of an utterance u if and only if there is
a proposition p such that u stands in relation R to p and p stands in relation R* to U
(cf. Kalish et al. 1980, pp. 11–12). On the other hand, if we had a theory of
formalization, we could either use it to complement a theory of propositions (more
on this in Sect. 3.3) or we could draw on the idea of tying propositions to literal
verbalizations and define: An utterance u expresses a proposition p if and only if p is
a literal verbalization of an adequate formalization of u. Since utterances generally
have more than one adequate formalization, this would imply that they also express
several propositions. Consequently, different formula substituting for the same
univocal utterance could stand for different propositions. This is not a problem for
proving validity, even though for independent reasons one may seek an account
which relates univocal utterances to one proposition only.19
Strategically, this leaves us with two options for (not) dealing with question (Q).
Standard practice of logic suggests that we settle for a modest program of logic which
takes logical analysis of ordinary language inferences as largely based on intuitive
skills of interpretation and paraphrase. We may still claim that formulas stand for
propositions, but we have to admit that this does not amount to an informative answer to
(Q), since we have given up on trying to explain how ordinary language utterances are
related to propositions and to formulas. Clearly, this widespread stance also abandons
the traditional program of logic which aspires to develop a theory that can show the
validity of inferences in ordinary language by means of logical proofs. Implicitly, this
program is committed to providing a theory of formalization, since without that we
have no theoretical support for claiming that a proof carried out in a logical formalism
gives us reason to accept a conclusion of an inference in ordinary language.
Alternatively, we may accept the challenge of addressing the relationship between
ordinary language and logical formulas. In this case, the core problem is to spell out
conditions for a formula to represent a logical form of an X an utterance is R-related to.
In short, a satisfactory answer to (Q) presupposes a theory of formalization. Since a
reasonably extensive treatment of theories of formalization lies outside the scope of this
paper (but see Brun 2004), the following section will be restricted to a discussion of
what can be learned from the preceding arguments for a theory of formalization and
what consequences for answering (Q) could be drawn from such a theory.
3 Formalization
In this paper, I use the term ‘‘theory of formalization’’ in a broad sense for accounts
which put us in a position to decide whether some sequence of formalizations counts
19 In Brun 2004, Chap. 13, I argue that in a certain sense all adequate formalizations of an utterance in a
given logical theory can be interpreted as representing aspects of a single logical form.
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as an adequate formalization of some given sequence of utterances (typically an
inference). I take this to cover theories that provide criteria of adequacy, as well as
procedures which can be used to find adequate formalizations for given utterances.20
3.1 Referring to Utterances
So what can we learn for a theory of formalization from the merits and pitfalls of the
proposals for (Q)? First of all, such a theory must not repeat the fatal mistakes found
in some of the proposals discussed. Here is one way how this could happen. On the
one hand, a theory of formalization cannot deal with particular utterances one at a
time, for the simple reason that doing so would not count as giving a theory. On the
other hand, most of what we can attribute to an utterance clearly is not relevant to its
formalization (colour of ink, whether you have approved of it and so on). Giving a
theory of formalization therefore calls for an answer to the question:
(F) What kind of description should a theory of formalization use to refer to
utterances?
Answering (F) amounts to deciding what information about an utterance is needed
for determining which formalization(s) should count as adequate. As a consequence,
any two utterances which differ only in information not included in the kind of
description chosen will be indistinguishable for the theory of formalization and
therefore cannot have different adequate formalizations. Question (F) may look
conspicuously related to (Q), since possible answers include claims like: a theory of
formalization should refer to utterances as tokens of sentences, because all that
matters for formalizing an utterance is what sentence it is a token of. But
nevertheless, (F) and (Q) are distinct questions. This becomes clear when we go
through some possible answers, beginning with those already considered for (Q).
Firstly, a theory of formalization must refer to utterances in a way that does not
beg substantial questions about their adequate formalizations. Otherwise the theory
will just be more or less trivial. That is, any answer to (F) must be given without
explicit or implicit reference to logical forms of Xs utterances are R-related to. This
immediately rules out the notions of proposition (and literal verbalizations and so
on) discussed in Sect. 2.4 as answers to (F).
Propositions understood as meanings fare no better. The reasons for rejecting
them are the same as in Sect. 2.2. If we forced a theory of formalization to accept
the same formalizations as adequate for all utterances expressing the same
proposition, we again would have to face trivial proofs for equivalences and mock
proofs for formally invalid inferences.
For sentences, there were two types of problems. Firstly, the type-token-relation
was found to be sensitive to linguistic differences irrelevant to logical form. In other
words, we have to allow that a formula substitutes for tokens of different sentences.
20 Classical starting points for procedures and theories of formalization are Montague (1970) (for an
application to extensional first-order logic see Link 1979, pp. 242–245) and Davidson (1984, 1980). A
third notable paradigm proceeds from Chomsky’s (1986, 1995) syntactical theories of LF, but see note 17.
An important discussion of criteria can be found in Blau (1977, Chap. I.1). Most of what follows can also
be applied to informal guidelines for formalizing as presented in e.g. Epstein (2001) and Sainsbury (2001).
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But this poses no problem for a theory of formalization. The arguments considered
in Sect. 2.3 imply only that if a theory of formalization deals with utterances qua
sentences, then it must admit that the same formalization may be adequate for
utterances of different sentences. Secondly, there were also problems related to the
requirement (C1) that whatever formulas stand for must have exactly one truth-
value. This also is a difficulty for a theory of formalization. For if we refer to
utterances qua tokens of sentences, we are not in a position to say that a
formalization may be adequate for some but not all utterances which are tokens of
the same sentence. As the arguments in Sect. 2.3 have shown, the core of this
problem is equivocation, which thereby also becomes crucial for sentences as
answers to (F).
3.2 Dealing with Equivocation
Choosing a strategy for addressing equivocation calls for several methodological
decisions. A first approach is based on the conviction that dealing with equivocation is
not a genuinely logical task and therefore proposes to hand it over to some preliminary
preparation of arguments, called something like ‘‘argument-analysis’’. This idea is
further supported by the fact that argument-analysis is needed anyway for
reconstructing arguments in ordinary discourse as inferences, if only for the reason
that arguments are usually not neatly structured in premises and conclusion. Given that
we are ready to accept the relatively strong precondition that we formalize only
inferences which are free of equivocation, the arguments considered give us no reason
why we should not refer to utterances qua sentences in a theory of formalization. This
proposal neatly fits established practice of formalization. It underlies logical analysis
that is found in textbooks and philosophical discussions, even though it is rarely made
explicit. Traces of this strategy can also clearly be found in Montague’s ground-
breaking work on formalization, where he proposes to use sentences of a
disambiguated language as input for a procedure of formalization (Montague 1970).
If, however, we think that relying on argument-analysis undermines the traditional
program of logic, we have to adopt a strategy for dealing with equivocation within a
theory of formalization. Since equivocation is highly context dependent, such a
theory can only be given if it is allowed to draw on information about the context of
utterances. It therefore must deal with descriptions of utterances that include not only
sentence-types, but also some information about the context of utterance. For this
purpose a notion of ‘‘utterance-type’’ can be introduced and defined as, for example, a
quadruple of sentence-type, speaker, place and time. Such a proposal has not been
mentioned as an answer to (Q), since in this role it would again face the problem that
one could not accommodate the fact that formulas must be able to substitute for
utterances which are tokens of different sentence-types. But in the context of a theory
of formalization, referring to utterance-types implies only that instances of different
utterance-types must be treated in the same way by the theory. Again, this proposal
can be found in an important paradigm for theories of formalization. It is basically
what Davidson argues for when he insists that a theory of meaning should refer to
utterances rather than sentences. (And he also argues that the adequacy of a
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formalization can only be judged in the context of a theory of meaning. Cf. Davidson
1980, pp. 144–145, 1999, p. 35.) But he also concedes that it is an open question,
which features of the situation of utterance turn out to be indispensable if we are to
give such a theory (cf. Davidson 1984, pp. 8, 58, 149–150).
Assigning the task of handling equivocation to a theory of formalization implies
that such a theory must include a great deal of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic
analysis. This invites the objection that a theory of formalization should not address
problems which are not logical, but linguistic in nature and therefore should be
delegated to linguistics. To this one may reply (following Montague 1970) that there
is no guarantee that linguistics will provide a theory of formalization with the
information it needs, unless it is guided by logical considerations. If we put aside
such worries about division of labour, we may propose that theories of formalization
refer to utterances described as quadruples of sentence-type, syntactic, semantic and
pragmatic structure. Grandy (1993, pp. 57–58), for example, puts forward such a
solution under the label ‘‘fully specified strings’’, although not as an answer to (F)
but to (Q). This strategy can be supported against utterance-types by another line of
argument. Since a theory of formalization needs to be concerned exclusively with
logical form, it need not bother identifying meanings or references of utterances or
their parts, but only avoid the fallacy of equivocation. And for doing this, the
structures included in fully specified strings, it is hoped, are sufficient; we do not
need to know about speaker, time and so on. Davidson, on the other hand, must
insist on including such information, because his theories of meaning are designed
to give a systematic account of truth-conditions. That obviously involves more than
representing logical forms, for not all truth-conditions are relevant to logical form.
‘‘Socrates is flying’’, for example, has the same logical form as ‘‘Theaitetos is
flying’’ yet not the same truth-conditions.
All three proposals (sentences, utterance-types and fully specified strings)
arguably are compatible with the traditional program of logic. What information,
exactly, about utterances is needed for a theory of formalization is another question.
Its answer depends on several factors. One is the distinction we want to draw
between logical theory, preliminary analysis of argument and linguistic analysis.
Others, such as the information needed to successfully address equivocation, are
still subject to argument and research. Given that we do not yet have any reasonably
comprehensive theories of formalization for an ordinary language, it may well be
best to try alternative approaches. Nevertheless, something can be said about how
(Q) could be answered, provided we had a theory of formalization.
3.3 Some Possible Answers
First of all, we may note that, together with a logical formalism, a theory of
formalization would provide all that is needed for a complete theoretical account of
the logical ‘‘core business’’ of proving validity. Giving a theory of valid inferences
does not imply that one has to come up with an answer to the question of what the
objects of logic are. Nevertheless, this question remains important owing to its
significance for a philosophical understanding of logical practice, but also because
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of its connection with related questions about the objects of propositional attitudes
and the bearers of truth and modality. I will therefore briefly examine some ideas
how a theory of formalization could be used for answering (Q).
The most straightforward idea would be to claim that formulas stand for
whatever we choose as an answer to (F). The three options considered in the
preceding section (sentences, utterance-types and fully specified strings), however,
are not viable candidates. They would just reintroduce some of the problems with
sentences discussed in Sect. 2.3. Utterance-types and fully specified strings are n-
tuples including a sentence-type. Hence, they partition utterances into equivalence
classes which are at least as fine-grained as those constituted by sentence-types and
in fact are subclasses thereof. Consequently, (C4) could not be met if one of the last
section’s proposals for answering (F) was used as an answer to (Q).
We may also note that a theory of formalization would put us in a position to
realize the utterance-and-content-strategy outlined in the second half of Sect. 2.1.
Firstly, we can define the relation representing a logical form of an utterance
appealed to in (U):
(32) / represents a logical form of u iff / is a formula and u is an utterance and
there is an adequate formalization of u with /.
Secondly, a theory of formalization can be used to complete (O*) since it must, at
least implicitly, specify the conditions under which two utterances count as having
the same content:
(33) For all utterances u1 and u2: u1 stands in relation S (‘‘same content’’) to u2 iff
there is a formalization U such that the sequence hu1, u2i can be adequately
formalized by hU, Ui.
However, as we have seen in Sect. 2.1, the application of these principles is far too
limited to provide a satisfactory account of the traditional program of logic.
More attractive ways of answering (Q) take up suggestions made in Sect. 2.4.
First, a theory of formalization would make it possible to give an account of X and
R by identifying Xs with literal verbalizations. R could then be defined as the
relation that holds between an utterance and an X if and only if X is a literal
verbalization of an adequate formalization of this utterance. To meet (C1), this
account would again have to be relativized to the context of an inference. Spelling
out (E), however, would no longer be necessary since equivocation will be dealt
with in a theory of formalization. Such a solution may appear as a rather shallow
technical manoeuvre not providing an informative answer to (Q). But this
appearance, I think, is misleading. One advantage of this proposal is that it makes
unmistakably clear the main finding of the preceding discussion: whatever the
objects are formulas stand for, their relation to utterances must essentially be
dependent on their logical forms. Furthermore, we may interpret literal verbaliza-
tions in their role as the objects of logic as an intermediate solution, for example, by
taking them as standard expressions of propositions, which in turn have to be
explained by some theory. This, of course, suggests that we could also bypass literal
verbalizations and give an answer to (Q) by combining a theory of formalization
with an account of propositions that takes propositions to be assigned to utterances
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on the basis of their logical forms. Such a solution could be developed for various
theories of propositions. The crucial point concerns relation R. It can be framed as
follows:
(P) u stands in relation R to p iff u is an utterance and p is a proposition and there
is a formalization U such that (i) U is an adequate formalization of u
(according to the theory of formalization) and (ii) all utterances that can be
adequately formalized by U express p (according to the theory of
propositions).
As has been pointed out in Sect. 2.4, current theories of propositions are not
designed for explaining (ii), but for the purpose of accounting for propositions as
objects of propositional attitudes. Consequently, they focus on explaining the
relationship between utterances and some structure more fine-grained than logical
forms relevant for answering (Q). But if a theory of propositions lacks an
explication of relation (ii), this does not imply that it is impossible to adapt it
accordingly (see Salmon 1992 for a development in this direction). Such an account
would certainly constitute a theoretically more ambitious solution than the ones
considered above. Two challenges have to be met for working it out. A notion of
expression which can be used for (ii) above has to be introduced and we need a
theory of formalization.
In conclusion, I will present some retrospective comments on the question why
the dispute about statements, propositions and sentences has not lead to a
satisfactory answer to (Q) so far.
First, the debate has often addressed simultaneously (Q) and some different
questions. For one thing, there is a certain danger of conflating (Q) and (F). For
another, it is often assumed that (Q) and the questions ‘‘What are the bearers of
truth?’’ and ‘‘What do we relate to by propositional attitudes?’’ have one and the
same answer. It would of course be desirable for reasons of systematicity that one
could identify some kind of entity that does all these jobs. But as answers to (Q),
many notions answering the latter questions either trivialize a great deal of logic or
introduce logically irrelevant distinctions that block numerous logical proofs. In any
case, it should not simply be taken for granted that all these questions admit for one
common answer.
Secondly, attempts to answer (Q) have probably often followed a strategy of
explaining what formulas stand for by appeal to some linguistic notion with more or
less readily available criteria of identity. Expressing the same meaning, saying the
same thing, being tokens of the same sentence-type and being identical qua
utterance, even if not fully understood, are at least old acquaintances. Nevertheless,
that these notions are readily available and seemingly unproblematic should not
deceive anybody about their unsuitability for answering (Q).
Thirdly, proposals informed by logic, such as logically structured propositions,
tend to overlook that (Q) does not only call for specifying a class of objects, but also
addresses the relationship between formulas and ordinary language. Moreover, it
does not suffice to claim that logical forms are a crucial factor in determining what
propositions utterances express. A theoretical account of this relationship is needed
for an informative answer to (Q), and that calls for a theory of formalization, just as
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logical proofs of valid inferences do. If most advocates of propositions neglect this,
they are in good company. But that is no reason for giving up this part of the
traditional program of logic.
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